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Migration and Urban Poverty and Inequality in China 
 
Using data from recent surveys of migrants and local residents in 10 cities in 2005, this paper 
examines how migration influences measurements of urban poverty and inequality in China, 
and also compares how other indicators of well-being differ for migrants and local residents. 
Contrary to previous studies that report that the income poverty rate of migrant households is 
1.5 times that of local resident households, we find relatively small differences in the poverty 
rates of migrants and local residents. Although the hourly wages of migrants are much lower 
than those of local residents, migrant workers work longer hours and have lower dependency 
ratios and higher labor force participation rates. Including migrants increases somewhat 
measures of urban income inequality. Significant differences between migrants and local 
residents are found for non-income welfare indicators such as housing conditions and access 
to social insurance programs. 
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1. Introduction 
The issues of unemployment and poverty in urban China have aroused a lot of research 
interest in recent years. Prior to the 1990s, the urban poverty issue was trivial because state 
provision of jobs and housing, pension, and health insurance benefits were guaranteed for nearly 
all urban residents. In 1990, the number of the urban poor was estimated to be only 1.3 million, 
or 0.4 percent of the urban population (World Bank, 1992). During the 1990s, labor markets in 
urban China witnessed two important changes. First, widespread downsizing and closure of 
state-owned enterprises led to the layoffs of millions of urban workers, many of whom were not 
covered by government social assistance programs (Giles, Park, and Cai, 2005). Second, rural to 
urban migration increased dramatically, especially to large, coastal cities. The 2000 census found 
that 12.2 percent of the urban population were migrants. In cities (excluding townships), 
migrants accounted for 14.6 percent of the population and 19.6 percent of employed workers. 
Recently, new estimates have been made of the extent of urban poverty in China. The 
estimated poverty rates have varied depending on the datasets used and the assumptions made in 
determining the poverty lines for different years.
1  A common shortcoming of all of these studies 
                                                        
1  World Bank (2009) reports a national urban income poverty headcount rate of 2.7 percent using a $2/day poverty 
line and 9.7 percent using a $3/day poverty line.    Meng, Gregory, and Wang (2005) report an urban income poverty 
rate in 2000 of 1.7 to 4.0 percent using low and high lines calculated based on province-urban specific food bundles.   
Ravallion and Chen (2007) report a national urban income poverty rate of 0.54 percent in 2002 using a poverty line 
of 1200 yuan. Khan (1998) reports that urban poverty incidence increased by 12 percent from 1988 to 1995 using 
the China Household Income and Poverty Survey (CHIPS) data conducted by the Institute of Economics, CASS.  
The Asian Development Bank (2002) estimated that urban poverty incidence was 4.7 percent in 1998, but varied 
significantly among provinces.  Based on the updated CHIPS data, Li (2001) calculated that the number of the 
urban poor was 23 million in 1999 with an incidence of 5.1 percent, and the poverty depth became more severe.  
The study group of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated that the range of urban poverty incidence was 
from 4.4 percent to 5.8 percent with no clear trend in increase or decrease between 1991 and 1995 (Ren and Chen, 
1996).  New estimates of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) show that there was a slight reduction of urban 
poverty from 4.4 percent in 1995 to 3.4 percent in 2000 with the NBS poverty diagnostic line, which is about three   2
is that they use data from surveys that exclude migrant households from the sampling frame.  
Most prominently, the National Bureau of Statistics’ annual urban household survey does not 
systematically sample migrants. Large cities in many developing countries have large migrant 
populations that are poor, frequently living in slums and relying on the informal sector for 
employment. The United Nations Human Settlements Program (2003) predicted that absent new 
government interventions given current urbanization trends over the next 30 years one in every 
three people worldwide would live in urban slums characterized by poor public health, 
inadequate public services, and widespread violence and insecurity. Thus, exclusion of migrants 
from urban poverty and inequality measurement could lead to substantial bias. 
A couple of recent studies have provided survey-based estimates of the poverty rate of 
both migrants and local residents. A recent report on urban poverty by the ADB uses data from a 
one-time survey conducted by NBS of 3600 migrants living in 26 provincial capital cities and 5 
other cities (Dalian, Ningbo, Xiamen, Qingdao and Shenzhen) in 1999 to analyze the poverty 
situation of migrants (ADB, 2004; Hussain 2003). The report estimates an income poverty 
headcount rate of 15.2 percent for migrants compared to 10.3 percent for local residents using 
NBS annual urban survey data for the same cities. A recent study using data from the China 
Income Distribution Survey (CIDS) conducted in 2002 in collaboration with NBS in cities in 6 
provinces estimates income poverty headcount rates of 3 percent for local residents and 10 
percent for migrants using locally set poverty lines, and 6 percent for local residents and 16 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
times that of rural official poverty line (Hussain, 2001, 2003).    If the benefit line of the Minimum Living Standard 
Scheme (MLSS) is chosen as the criteria of poverty measurement, urban poverty incidence was about 4.1-4.3 
percent between 2002 and 2004.   3
percent for migrants using a higher poverty line (Du, Gregory, and Meng, 2006).
2  However,  in 
both of these surveys, incomes of local residents are based on self-recorded diaries used by 
NBS’s annual urban household surveys while the incomes of migrants are based on one-time 
surveys that are known to produce lower income estimates. In addition, the local resident sample 
used by the ADB also excluded zero-income households and the CIDS surveyed only rural 
migrants, excluding urban migrants who are likely to have higher incomes. For all of these 
reasons, both studies are likely to overstate the poverty rate of migrants relative to local residents.   
These problems also mean that studies of urban-rural income gaps which also use the CIDS will 
underestimate urban-rural income gaps, or overestimate the effect of including migrants on 
reducing urban-rural differences.  However, even with this bias, these chapters find that 
including migrants has a relatively small effect on measured urban-rural income differences.   
In this paper, we analyze data from household surveys in 12 cities in 2004 and 2005 that 
use a common survey questionnaire and survey methodology for both migrants (including both 
rural migrants and urban migrants) and local residents. Contrary to previous studies that report 
that income poverty of migrant households is 1.5 times that of local resident households, we find 
relatively small differences in the poverty rates of migrants and local residents. Although the 
hourly wages of rural migrants are much lower than those of local residents, rural migrant 
households have lower dependency ratios and rural migrants have higher labor force 
participation rates and work longer hours. Including migrants does increase somewhat measures 
of urban income inequality. In contrast to poverty comparisons, significant differences between 
                                                        
2  The locally set poverty lines are minimum income per capita lines for obtaining urban dibao subsidy payments.   4
migrants and local residents are found for non-income welfare indicators such as housing 
conditions and access to social insurance programs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the survey data.  
Section 3 presents measures of poverty incidence for migrants and local residents.  Section 4 
describes the characteristics of poor households. Section 5 examines income inequality.    Section 
6 examines non-income welfare measures, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
In 2005, the Institute of Population and Labor Economics (IPLE) of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) conducted the second round of the China Urban Labor 
Survey (CULS) in 5 large cities
3 (all provincial capitals) in different parts of the country. The 
surveys were conducted in collaboration with faculty at the University of Michigan and 
Michigan State University, and supported by the World Bank. The CULS surveyed migrant and 
local resident households in each city. The 2005 CULS also surveyed migrants in 5 small cities 
located near the 5 large cities; in these small cities local resident households had been surveyed 
in the previous year by IPLE as part of the China Urban Social Protection survey (CUSP).
4 The 
five large cities and five small cities are located in different regions of the country. Shanghai and 
Wuxi (Jiangsu Province) are located in the Yangtze River Delta near the coast; Wuhan and 
                                                        
3  In this paper, we define capital cities as large cities and prefectural cities as small cities for simplification. 
According to this definition, there are 286 cities that include both prefectural cities and capital cities in 2005. Their 
population amounts 130.8 million, accounting for 19.4 percent of total urban population.   
4  Two additional cities also were included: Daqing, a city in Heilongjiang Province rich in oil resources, and 
Shenzhen, a city in Guangdong Province near Hong Kong, famous for its open labor market, large number of 
migrants, and private enterprise development. In this paper we restrict attention to the 5 large and 5 small cities.   5
Yichuan are in Hubei Province in central China; Shenyang and Benxi are in Liaoning Province in 
the northeast; Fuzhou and Zhuhai are in Fujian and Guangdong provinces in the southeast; and 
Xian and Baoji are in Shaanxi Province in the northwest.   
Table 1 summarizes some basic information on the 10 cities. The total population ranges 
from 6.6 to 13.5 million in the 5 large cities, and from 0.6 to 1.7 million in the 5 small cities.  
The average size of the total population in the 5 large cities is 8.5 million, or 7.4 times that in the 
5 small cities. There is substantial variation in the level of economic development across cities, 
with coastal cities (Shanghai, Fuzhou, Wuxi, Zhuhai) having significantly higher per capita 
incomes. 
In each city, representative samples of local residents and migrants were independently 
selected in a 2-stage procedure. Using recent data on the local resident population of each 
neighborhood, a fixed number of neighborhoods were selected in each city using probability 
proportionate to size (PPS) sampling.
5 In each selected neighborhood, a sampling frame (list of 
households) was constructed in consultation with staff of neighborhood offices. Most 
neighborhood committees had complete, updated lists of local residents, and information on 
migrants who had registered as temporary residents. Neighborhood office staff also were aware 
of unregistered migrants living in the neighborhood, especially those operating small businesses. 
Using the constructed sampling frame for each neighborhood, a fixed number of households 
were randomly sampled in each neighborhood. In large cities, about 500 local resident 
                                                        
5In many cities, information was unavailable about the number of migrants living in each neighborhood. In such 
cases, neighborhoods were first selected based on local resident populations, and weights are used to correct for 
differences in the relative sizes of migrant and local resident populations using data on migrant population collected 
during the survey.     6
households and 500 migrant households were sampled, and in the other cities the sample sizes 
were 400 or 500 of each type of household. In all, the survey collected data on 6324 local 
resident households and 5521 migrant households (See Table 1 for a detailed sampling 
breakdown).  
For each household, information on each adult household member was collected on age, 
gender, education, marital status, party membership, type of hukou, health status, employment 
situation (wages, labor force participation, unemployment status, work history, and current job 
characteristics such as industry and occupation), access to social insurance (pensions, medical 
insurance, unemployment insurance), and education and training. The survey also collected 
household-level information on consumption expenditures, income transfers, social assistance, 
and housing conditions.   
For the goals of this paper, the strengths of the CULS are that it surveys migrants 
(including rural migrants and urban migrants) and local residents in an identical fashion, it 
collects very detailed information on income and expenditure, and it collects enough 
observations per city to calculate city-level aggregates. At the same time, there are also several 
limitations of the data.  First, for the 5 smaller cities, migrants were surveyed in 2005 while 
local residents were surveyed in 2004. Provincial CPIs are used to deflate all incomes to 2003 
price levels, and an adjustment is made to account for mean real income growth in the five cities 
from 2004 to 2005.
6 Second, by sampling migrants through neighborhood committees, it is 
                                                        
6In 2005, based on local government reports, the real growth rates of average disposable income were 17.8 percent 
in Wuxi, 7.9 percent in Yichan, 17.0 percent in Benxi, 7.9 percent in Zhuhai, and 10.0 percent in Baoji. We use these 
growth rates to adjust 2004 real urban household income to expected real income levels in 2005, implicitly assuming   7
likely that migrants living in collective forms of housing, such as dormitories provided by work 
units, are under-sampled since such individuals typically do not register with local neighborhood 
committees. However, because migrants living in dormitories typically are employed and not 
living with dependents, they may be less likely to be poor, which would lead us to overstate the 
poverty rate of migrants in urban areas.   
 
3. Income poverty 
3.1. Poverty line 
Unlike for rural poverty, in China there is no official government poverty line to measure 
urban poverty and there are no official estimates of the number of urban poor.    However, as part 
of the government’s minimum living standard (dibao) program, each city designates an income 
threshold, or dibao line, to determine whether households are eligible to receive government 
social assistance subsidies. In practice, richer cities tend to have higher dibao lines, either 
because they can afford them or because the lines reflect relative rather than absolute poverty. To 
create a uniform poverty line suitable for our purposes, we calculate a national mean dibao line 
by taking the population-weighted average of all dibao lines in China after first adjusting for 
spatial price differences using the indices calculated by Brandt and Holz (2005). As seen in Table 
2, this line is equal to 1982 yuan per capita in 2003. It turns out that among our 10 cities, in only 
two cities (Yichan and Baoji) is the national mean dibao line larger than the actual dibao line. 
We also consider 4 other poverty lines.  The first is the official rural low income line 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
no change in the relative income distribution from 2004 to 2005.   8
adjusted to take account of urban-rural price differences in each province. The low income line is 
much higher than the austere official poverty line of 637 yuan per capita, but at 1112 yuan per 
capita in 2003 remains significantly lower than the mean dibao line. The other three lines are the 
$1/day, $2/day, and $3/day poverty lines.  The $1/day line is used by the World Bank for 
international poverty comparisons, and at 1124 yuan per capita is very close in magnitude to the 
adjusted low income line. Multiples of the $1/day line are used to examine how the results 
change at higher lines. Both the $2/day and $3/day lines are higher than the mean dibao line.   
Table 2 also presents other poverty lines, including ones used in other studies, for 
purposes of comparison. The national mean dibao line is very close to the poverty line used by 
NBS in 2000 and to three times the official rural poverty line. In sections 4 and 5, we use the 
national mean dibao line to examine in greater detail the determinants of poverty. 
 
3.2. Poverty Incidence 
Table 3 reports the estimates of poverty incidence across cities when using the different 
poverty lines. Not surprisingly, estimated poverty rates vary with the chosen poverty line.  In 
large cities, the urban poverty headcount rate ranges from 1.3 percent using the low income line 
to 9.7 percent using the $3/day line; in small cities the headcount rates for the same lines are 3.0 
percent and 12.0 percent.   
Our main focus is comparing the poverty rates of local residents and migrants, and seeing 
how inclusion of migrants affects overall measures of poverty and inequality. For large cities, the 
migrant poverty headcount rate of 1.4 percent is slightly higher than the 1.3 percent poverty rate   9
of local residents using the adjusted rural low income line.  However, at higher poverty lines, 
the poverty rate of migrants is less than that of local residents.  Using the national dibao line, 
the migrant poverty rate is 2.5 percent compared to 3.2 percent for local residents, and using the 
$3/day line, the migrant poverty rate is 9.6 percent compared to 9.8 percent for local residents. 
In small cities, the poverty rate of migrants is clearly higher than that of local residents 
when using low poverty lines. Using the adjusted rural low income line urban households, the 
poverty headcount rate of migrants is 5.3 percent compared to 2.6 percent for local residents, and 
using the national dibao line, the poverty headcount rate was 6.2 percent for migrants compared 
to 5.6 percent for local residents.    However, just as for larger cities, as the poverty line increases, 
migrant poverty rates in small cities become smaller than that of local urban residents.  Using 
the $3/day line, the poverty headcount rate for migrants is 10.5 percent, compared to 12.4 
percent for local residents.  Overall the poverty rate differences between migrants and local 
residents are relatively small, and which is larger depends on which poverty line is chosen. 
These differences mask considerable heterogeneity across cities.  Table 4 reports the 
poverty rates for local residents and migrants by city using different poverty lines.  Using the 
national dibao line. In 3 of the 5 large cities and in 4 of 5 small cities, the poverty rate of 
migrants is higher than that of local residents.
7  The differences across cities are relatively robust 
to the poverty line chosen.   
To what extent is the relatively low poverty rate of migrants due to the fact that the 
                                                        
7In the other 2 CULS sample cities, Shenzhen and Daqing, the poverty rates of migrants are also higher than those of 
local residents.   10
migrant sample includes both rural and urban migrants? We would expect urban migrants to have 
higher incomes and lower poverty rates than rural migrants. Table 3 presents poverty rates for the 
rural migrant sample separately.  Since 77 percent of migrants are rural migrants, the poverty 
rate of migrants is generally very close to the poverty rate of rural migrants.  However, it is 
interesting that in large cities, the poverty rate of rural migrants is actually lower than that of all 
migrants, implying that rural migrants are less likely to be poor than urban migrants.    For small 
cities, we obtain an opposite result; rural migrants have a higher poverty rate than urban migrants.   
Using the national mean dibao line, the poverty rate of rural migrants is 2.1 percent compared to 
5.1 percent of urban migrants, while for small cities the poverty rate is 6.8 percent for rural 
migrants and 3.6 percent for urban migrants.   
How does the inclusion of migrants affect the measured overall poverty rate in urban 
areas? Define P to be the urban poverty headcount rate,  M P and  L P to be the poverty headcount 
rates for migrants and local residents, respectively, and  M R to be the share of migrants in the 
total urban population. Then, the change in the measured poverty rate associated with the 
inclusion migrants is the difference between P and  L P , which can be expressed as follows: 
  () L ML M PPP P P R      (1) 
The impact of migration on the urban poverty rate depends on the difference in the poverty 
incidences of migrants and local residents and the share of migrants in the population.
8 
                                                        
8  It is quite easy to develop the formula to the inclusion of both rural migrants and urban migrants. Define 
,,, L RU PP P Pto be the poverty headcount rates of all households, local households, rural migrant households and 
urban migrant households, respectively; and , RU R R to be the shares of rural migrants and urban migrants in the total 
urban population, respectively, then changes in urban poverty rate associated with the inclusion of rural migrants   11
We estimate the share of migrants in the population based on data from the CULS 
neighborhood surveys, which include questions about the total population and migrant 
population in each neighborhood. Using this method, migrants account for 16 percent of the total 
population in the CULS cities surveyed in 2005. This compares to a migrant population share of 
26 percent found by the 2000 census in the 2005 CULS sample cities. The difference in shares 
could reflect sampling biases in the CULS survey if workers living in dormitories or workplaces 
are systematically under-reported by neighborhood committees.
9  
Given the relatively small differences in estimated poverty rates for migrants and local 
residents reported in Table 3 and a migrant population share of only 16 percent, it is not 
surprising that including migrants has a negligible impact on the overall urban poverty estimates 
(last column of Table 3). Even when we use the higher migrant population shares found in the 
2000 census to construct sampling weights, including migrants has little effect on overall poverty 
rate estimates (results not reported). For example, using the national mean dibao line, there is no 
change in the urban poverty estimates for either large or small cities.  Using the adjusted rural 
low income line and $1/day line, there is no change in poverty estimates for large cities, and an 
increase in the poverty rate from 2.6 to 3.0 percent in small cities. Using the highest poverty line, 
the $3/day line, the urban poverty rate decreases from 9.8 percent to 9.7 percent in large cities 
and from 12.4 percent to 12.0 percent in small cities.     
One might be concerned that ignoring the close connection between migrants and their 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
and urban migrants are  () () L RL R UL U PP P P R P P R    . 
9In fact, many larger work units do not report their workers to neighborhood committees at all but rather report 
directly to local Bureaus of Public Security.   12
families back home may obscure assessments of their true level of welfare.  Specifically, 
migrants in urban areas could be remitting much of their income to non-coresident family 
members back home, and so have much less disposable income than we are estimating.  There 
are two ways to address this problem.    First, we could focus on consumption-based estimates of 
the poverty rate.  However, because migrants must pay significantly more income to rent 
housing than local residents, using consumption measures actually increases the status of 
migrants relative to local residents.  Calculating imputed rental values of owner-occupied 
housing is beyond the scope of this paper, but could yield sharper differences in the welfare of 
urban residents and migrants.   
A second approach is to use income per capita net of private remittances in the poverty 
calculations. If migrants remit a large share of their incomes to family members living in their 
hometowns, their own living standard in the city may be adversely affected and they may be 
more likely to be classified as poor.  However, according to the survey data, on average net 
remittances of rural migrants accounts for only 6.9 percent of their income.  This compares to 
6.0 percent for urban migrants and 3.9 percent for local residents.  Thus, adjusting for 
remittances only reduces the relative income of migrants compared to local residents by 3.0 
percent (6.9 percent minus 3.9 percent).  Not surprisingly, this has virtually no effect on the 
relative poverty rates of local residents and migrants, as seen in Table 5 which presents the same 
poverty headcount rates as Table 3 but using income per capita net of remittances.  Comparing 
Table 5 to Table 3, we find that none of the previous results are altered. 
   13
3.3. Depth of Poverty 
Sen (1992) pointed out that the depth of poverty is highly sensitive to the income 
distribution of the poor.  Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) put forward the following 










   





normalized poverty gap, and is a parameter that captures aversion to the degree of poverty.  
FGT (0) is the headcount ratio;  FGT (1) is the average normalized poverty gap; and  FGT (2) is 
the average squared normalized poverty gap. 
Table 6 presents the poverty gaps using the national mean dibao line as the poverty line. 
In the 5 large cities, the average normalized poverty gap for local residents, migrants, and all 
residents are 1.5 percent, 1.3 percent and 1.4 percent, while they are 2.7 percent, 4.6 percent and 
3.1 percent in the 5 small cities.  The average squared normalized poverty gaps for local 
residents, migrants, and all residents are all 1.0 percent in the 5 large cities, while they are 2.0 
percent, 4.1 percent and 2.4 percent in the 5 small cities.  Overall, for large cities inclusion of 
migrants has little impact on measures of the depth of poverty, similar to the results for poverty 
incidence.  However, for the small cities, the depth of poverty of migrants is significantly 
higher than that of local residents, so that including migrants increases the poverty gap from 2.7 
to 3.1 (14.8 percent), and increases the squared poverty gap from 2.0 percent to 2.4 percent (20.0 
percent).    This is not surprising in light of the earlier evidence that at low poverty lines, in small   14
cities the incidence of poverty was noticeably higher than that of local residents. 
 
4. Who Are the Urban Poor? 
It may be surprising to some readers that migration does not significantly increase urban 
poverty. A large part of the explanation can be seen by comparing the characteristics of the 
migrant population with those of local residents, and considering how these differences result 
from China’s unique institutional environment.   
In Table 7, for migrants and local residents, we summarize the means of key employment 
variables, including labor force participation, unemployment, hourly wages, and hours worked. 
The labor force participation rate of adult migrants is 89 percent in large cities and 84 percent in 
small cities, compared to 56 and 50 percent for adult local residents.  Similarly, the 
unemployment rate of migrants is 1.6 and 4.5 percent in large and small cities, compared to 8.5 
and 8.8 percent for local residents.
10    Finally, migrants on average work 283 hours per month in 
large cities and 250 hours per month in small cities, compared to 184 and 183 hours per week for 
local residents.  Thus, in large cities, even though mean hourly earnings of migrants is only 
about a third of that of local residents, the share of adult migrants who work is 75 percent greater 
than the share of adult local residents who work, and migrants typically work more than 50 
percent more hours than local residents.  In small cities, the hourly wage differences are much 
less pronounced but the differences in the other employment variables are similar.  Another 
important difference between migrant and local resident households is that the dependency ratio 
                                                        
10  The 2000 census data finds that for all of China, the unemployment rate of migrants was 4.7 percent, while that of 
local residents was 12.7 percent (Giles, Park, and Zhang, 2005).   15
(household size divided by number of able workers) is only 1.5 for migrants and 2.1 for local 
residents (Table 7).     
These patterns are consistent with a great deal of self-selection characterizing the 
migration process.  First, rural out-migrants tend to have better human capital than the labor 
that remains behind in rural areas (Wang, et. al., 2004). Second, in China, all rural households 
have access to land and are socially connected to their home villages, so that if migrants are 
unable to find decent-paying jobs in cities, they are likely to return to their family farms. Third, 
many migrants leave dependents in their home villages, especially if their earnings in the city are 
insufficient to pay for housing, education, or other costs of living in the city. This means that 
low-wage earners are less likely to live with dependents, reducing the likelihood of poverty 
measured on a per capita basis. If a single migrant lives in a work-place dormitory, she only 
needs to earn 166 yuan per month (including in-kind benefits such as meals) to avoid being poor 
using the national mean dibao line as the poverty line. 
Which households are more likely to be poor? Table 8 summarizes the mean 
characteristics of non-poor and poor households for both local resident and migrant households. 
The characteristics correlated with poverty appear to be similar for both local residents and 
migrants.  First, there is no big difference in the distributions of household size between poor 
and non-poor households. Second, the dependency ratio is significantly higher among the poor. 
Third, the poor tend to be less educated.  For local residents, the poor are much less likely to 
have a college education, while for migrants the poor are much more likely to have primary 
school education only. Finally, the work status of the poor is very different than that of the   16
nonpoor. Most strikingly, about one fourth of the poor have unemployed workers in their families, 
compared to just 4.9 percent of non-poor local residents and 1.3 percent of non-poor migrants. 
The poor are also much more likely to be out of the labor force. 
We analyze the determinants of poverty in a multivariate framework by estimating probit 
models of poverty status for local residents and migrant households separately. Table 9 presents 
the marginal probabilities that households are found to be poor, once again using the national 
mean dibao line as the poverty line.  Age, education, and employment variables are for the 
household head. The findings for the most part confirm the descriptive results presented in Table 
8.    For migrant households, if the household head has a middle school education the probability 
of being poor falls by 1.1 percent compared to not having completed middle school, if the 
household head is working the probability of being poor falls by 3.2 percent, and if the 
household head has an urban hukou the probability of being poor falls by 0.9 percent.    Poverty 
of local resident households is not as responsive to these factors, but is more responsive to 
household size.    Increasing household size by one person reduces the probability of being poor 
by 0.1 percent.    The results also suggest that for both migrants and local residents, being poor is 
associated with lack of access to social insurance programs. 
 
5. Urban Income Inequality 
In this section, we examine how migrants affect the overall distribution of income in 
cities. The simplest way to examine income distributions is to simply plot the empirical 
distributions. Figure 1 does so for urban and migrant households, separately for large and small   17
cities. We see that compared to local residents, the income distribution for migrant households is 
more tightly concentrated (narrower tails) around a lower mean in the 5 large cities, and is 
somewhat similar in shape in the 5 small cities except for at the bottom distribution, where it 
appears that migrants are more likely to be very poor but less likely to have incomes in the range 
just above the poorest levels.     
We can also use Lorenz curves to compare income distributions. As shown in Figure 2, 
the income Lorenz curves of local resident and migrant households intersect for the 5 large cities, 
but most of the income Lorenz curve of local residents is below that of migrant households, 
suggesting that income inequality of local residents is greater than that of migrant households.  
In contrast, the income Lorenz curve of local residents is above Lorenz curve for migrant 
households for the 5 small cities, so that income inequality of local residents appears to be 
smaller than that of migrant households.  Compared with rural migrants, the income Lorenz 
curves of urban migrants are below them in both large cities and small cities. In general, it also 
appears that income inequality is greater in the small cities than in the large cities. 
Table 10 summarizes income inequality of local residents, migrants, and total populations 
using two commonly used inequality measures--the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. The 
Gini is more sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution while the Theil index is more 
sensitive to changes in the tails of the distribution. Comparing the Gini (Theil) measures of local 
resident and migrant households, we find that the former is greater than the latter in 3 of 5 large 
cities, in 2 of 5 (1 of 5) small cities, and also in Daqing and Shenzhen. For the 5 large cities 
combined, the Gini coefficient for local residents is 0.388, larger than the Gini for migrants   18
(0.376). For the 5 small cities, in contrast, the Gini coefficient for local residents (0.404) is lower 
than that for migrants (0.481). Using the Theil index, inequality is greater for migrants both in 
large cities and in small cities.  Finally, comparing the inequality measures for the total 
population with that for local residents only, we find that using either the Gini or Theil measures, 
inequality is greater with the inclusion of migrants.  For the large cities, the increase is very 
slight, while for small cities, the increases are significant (the Gini increases from 0.402 to 0.418 
and the Theil index increases from 0.282 to 0.337).   
The Theil index is one of the generalized entropy (GE) indices, which have the attractive 
property that they are easily decomposed. Theoretically, a GE index can be additively 
decomposed into two components: within-group inequality and between-group inequality. It is 
straightforward to derive the following expression for the change in inequality caused by 
including migrants in the sample: 
  () * _ LM L M GE GE GE GE GE S GE B     .
11   (2) 
Here, GEM and GEL are the subgroup income inequality measures for migrant and local resident 
households, SM is the income share of migrants, and GE_B is between-group inequality. The 
impact of migration on the urban income distribution depends on the difference of income 
inequality among migrants and among local residents, the overall income share of migrant 
                                                        
11 Assume GE_W and GE_B represent within-group and between-group inequality, SM is the income share of 
migrants, and GEM and GEL are the subgroup income inequality measures for migrants and local residents. We can 
decompose urban income inequality as follows: (1 ) _ MM M L GE S GE S GE GE B    . If  GE  is the 
change in the urban income inequality when migrant households are included in the sample, deriving (2) is 
straightforward.   19
households, and the difference in mean incomes of migrants and local residents
12. 
One can see from the first argument in (2) that the similarity in inequality of migrant 
incomes and local resident incomes leads to little change in overall inequality in large cities 
when migrants are included, but the greater inequality of migrant incomes in small cities leads to 
greater inequality in small cities when migrants are included in the sample. Between-group 
inequality does not appear to contribute significantly to changes in inequality in large cities, even 
though the mean income per capita of local residents is 27.6 percent greater than that of migrants.   
In small cities, the mean income per capita of migrants actually is 19.8 percent greater than that 
of local residents. 
 
6. Non-income welfare differences 
We next examine differences between local residents and migrants with respect to 
non-income welfare measures. In recent years, there has been much concern that migrants are 
discriminated against with respect to access to decent quality housing, access to social insurance 
and social assistance programs, and access to basic public services such as education (Cai and 
Wang, 2005).  Table 11 describes the housing conditions and access to social insurance 
programs based on the CULS data. The average area of housing are per capita for migrants was 
10.7 square meters, compared to 18.4 square meters for local residents, and migrant housing has 
much lower rates of provision of drinking water, sewage, and heating.  Table 11 also makes 
clear that migrants have almost no chance of obtaining valuable pension, unemployment 
                                                        
12  We can also develop the above formula to the inclusion of rural migrants and urban migrants separately. In fact, 
higher income inequality of urban migrants makes a certain contribution to the overall urban income inequality. We 
do not report this discussion in this paper for the simplicity.   20
insurance, or health insurance benefits, partly because most work in the private sector where 
such benefits often are not provided, and partly because of discriminatory policies of local 
governments.  In contrast, most local residents have pension programs and have health 
insurance.  Finally, other research using the CULS data finds that migrants must pay 
significantly higher school fees for their children if they do not have local hukous.  By policy, 
migrants are not eligible for the urban dibao program or other urban social assistance programs.   
Overall, it appears that inequality between migrants (especially rural migrants) and local 
residents in non-income dimensions of welfare are much higher than is reflected in a simple 
comparison of income per capita levels or income-based poverty measures. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main finding of this paper is that based on analysis of recent survey data from the 
2005 China Urban Labor Survey in 10 cities, we find that accounting for migrants does not 
significantly alter income-based estimates of urban poverty and inequality in China. This is not 
to say that migrants face no problems living and working in cities.  Quite to the contrary, 
studies using the same data find that migrants earn lower wages than local residents after 
controlling for observable characteristics, and they are much worse off than local residents in 
terms of a number of important non-income welfare indicators.   
The lack of significant income poverty among migrants reflects China’s unique 
institutions, which have enabled migration to be a selective process. Most migrants living in 
urban areas work long hours and have relatively few dependents living with them in the cities. It   21
is not obvious, however, whether such selectivity will persist as migration continues to increase 
in the future. According to United Nations predictions, 53.2 percent of China’s total population 
will live in cities and townships by 2020. The vast majority (more than 70 percent) of migrants 
surveyed by the CULS desired to stay in cities, with less than 20 percent of them wanting to 
return home (Table 12). The survey also found that about one third of migrants definitely expect 
to live in cities permanently, half report a likelihood of living in cities in the future, and only 15.5 
percent expecting not to live in cities (Table 12). The mean duration that surveyed migrants had 
lived in the city exceeded 9 years in 2005, compared to about 7 years in the first wave of the 
CULS in 2001.  This suggests that the nature of migration in China is quickly shifting from 
temporary, individual migration to permanent, family-based migration. This could lead to higher 
rates of unemployment and larger dependency ratios among migrant households in the future, as 
migration choices become increasingly irreversible. 
The survey data suggest that poverty among migrants is not a severe problem in urban 
areas.    However, there exist significant differences between migrants (especially rural migrants) 
and local residents in access to housing, social insurance programs, social assistance, and public 
services. As migration becomes increasingly permanent, it will be a great challenge to enable 
migrant households to become equal members of urban communities.       22
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Basic Information on Surveyed Cities   
 
 
Number of surveyed 
households 
Number of surveyed 














Large cities  2500   2514   2041  7485  5618  4680  42.3   11263  
  Shanghai  500   500  360  1440  1034  743  13.5   16683  
  Wuhan  500   503  434  1621  1253  1109  7.9   9564  
  Shenyang  494   494  373  1379  982  777  6.9   8924  
  Fuzhou  497   506  450  1545  1173  1058  6.6   11516  
  Xian  509   511  424  1500  1176  993  7.4   9628  
Small  cities  2323   1999  1614  7179  4848  4043  5.7   9763  
    Wuxi  500    402  286 1496 994  771  2.2    11647   
  Yichan  400   404  309  1208  973  770  1.2   7033  
  Benxi  523   400  345  1604  999  880  1.0   6347  
    Zhuhai  500    390  290 1662 987  773  0.8    16602   
  Baoji  400   403  384  1209  895  849  0.6   7049  
Note: (1) Figures of total population, per capita GDP and per capita disposable income in each city are from 
their 2005 statistical yearbooks. (2) Per capita GDP and per capita disposable income are the arithmetic 
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Table 2 
China Urban Poverty Lines 
 
  2003 yuan 
Poverty lines used in analysis   
Adjusted rural low income line  1112 
World Bank $1/day  1124 
National mean dibao line  1982 
World Bank $2/day  2247 
World Bank $3/day  3371 
Other poverty lines   
Official rural poverty line (2003)  637 
Twice the official rural poverty line (2003)  1274 




MOCA poverty line (1999)
1 1825 
Triple the official rural poverty line (2003)  1911 
NBS poverty line (2000)
1 1948 
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Table 3 







Large  cities      
   Adjusted  rural  low  income  line  1.3  1.4  1.3  1.3 
   $1/day  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.4 
   National  mean  dibao  line  3.2  2.5  2.1  3.2 
   $2/day  3.8  3.3  3.0  3.8 
   $3/day  9.8  9.6  9.7  9.7 
Small  cities      
   Adjusted  rural  low  income  line  2.6  5.3  5.8  3.0 
   $1/day  2.6  5.3  5.8  3.0 
   National  mean  dibao  line  5.6  6.2  6.8  5.7 
   $2/day  6.6  6.6  7.3  6.6 
   $3/day  12.4  10.5  12.0  12.0 
 Table 4 
Urban Poverty Incidence by City 
 
  Adjusted rural low income line  National mean dibao line  $3/day 
City 
Local 
residents Migrants  All 
Local 
residents Migrants  All 
Local 
residents Migrants  All 
Large cities           
   Shanghai  0.4 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.4 3.8 3.5 
   Wuhan 1.8 1.3 1.8 5.2 4.5 5.1  18.9  19.7  15.9 
   S h e n yang  1.5 5.1 1.6 4.7 5.9 4.8 9.7  12.2  14.8 
   Fuzhou 0.3 2.4 0.5 1.3 2.8 1.4 5.6 8.4 1.6 
   Xian  2.9 1.3 2.5 5.4 2.3 4.7  15.8  8.1  14.3 
Small cities           
   Wuxi  1.2 3.4 1.5 1.9 4.0 2.1 4.0 6.6 1.3 
   Yichan  4.9  7.5  5.0  12.9 17.3 13.1 29.1 38.6 17.6 
   Benxi  1.2 5.3 1.2 2.6  11.5  2.7 7.1  33.8  47.5 
   Zhuhai 5.0 6.2 5.5 8.4 6.2 7.4  13.5  9.2 4.4 
   Baoji  1.7 0.2 1.7 5.0 3.3 4.9  15.1  23.2  31.7 Table 5 
Net Remittances by Urban Local Residents and Migrants 
 
  Sample 
size 









share of income 
(%) 
(1)/(2) 
Urban local residents  6324  12242  472  3.86 
Urban migrants    1341  17912  1066  5.95 
Rural migrants  4179  8842  614  6.94 
 
Table 5 






migrants   All 
Large  cities      
   Adjusted  rural  low  income  line  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.6 
   $1/day  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.6 
   National  mean  dibao  line  3.6  3.3  3.0  3.5 
   $2/day  4.2  4.5  4.3  4.2 
   $3/day  10.3  13.0  13.4  10.6 
Small  cities      
   Adjusted  rural  low  income  line  3.4  5.6  6.0  3.8 
   $1/day  3.4  5.6  6.0  3.8 
   National  mean  dibao  line  6.9  6.6  7.2  6.8 
   $2/day  8.2  6.9  7.6  8.0 
   $3/day  14.8  12.0  13.4  14.3 
   1
Table 6 




residents  Migrants  Rural  migrants  Urban  migrants   All  
  Average normalized poverty gap (*100) 
Large cities  1.5  1.3  1.1  2.0  1.4 
   Shanghai  0.4  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.5 
   Wuhan  2.2  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.2 
   Shenyang  1.8  5.2  4.2  9.3  1.9 
   Fuzhou  0.4  2.5  2.6  1.5  0.5 
   Xian  2.8  0.8  0.5  3.5  2.3 
Small cities  2.7  4.6  5.0  3.1  3.1 
   Wuxi  1.3  3.1  3.7  0.9  1.5 
   Yichan  5.6  8.2  8.7  5.4  5.7 
   Benxi  1.0  5.6  5.2  8.2  1.1 
   Zhuhai  5.3  5.1  5.4  3.8  5.2 
   Baoji  1.8  0.8  0.9  0.0  1.7 
  Average squared normalized poverty gap (*100) 
Large cities  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.6  1.0 
   Shanghai  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.4 
   Wuhan  1.3  1.5  1.5  1.3  1.3 
   Shenyang  1.1  5.0  4.1  9.1  1.2 
   Fuzhou  0.3  2.4  2.5  1.3  0.5 
   Xian  2.1  0.4  0.2  2.4  1.7 
Small cities  2.0  4.1  4.4  2.9  2.4 
   Wuxi  1.1  2.9  3.4  0.9  1.3 
   Yichan  3.9  6.8  7.1  5.0  4.0 
   Benxi  0.6  5.1  4.6  8.1  0.6 
   Zhuhai  4.3  4.4  4.7  3.4  4.3 
   Baoji  1.1  1.9  2.0  0.0  1.2 
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Table 7   
Labor Participation Rate, Unemployment Rate, Working Hours and Hourly Wages 
 
    Local residents Migrants  Rural migrants  Urban migrants
Labor  force  participation  rate      
    Large  cities  56.1  89.3  89.6  87.9 
    Small  cities  50.1  84.0  84.7  81.3 
Unemployment  rate      
    Large  cities  8.5  1.6  1.3  3.0 
    Small  cities  8.8  4.5  5.1  2.4 
H o u r l y   w a g e s         
    Large  cities  14.7  4.6  4.1  7.1 
    Small  cities  8.3  7.6  6.1  13.1 
Working  hours       
    Large  cities  182.7  282.9  287.7  258.3 





Characteristics of Non-Poor and Poor Households 
 
   Urban  households  Migrant  households 
Rural migrant 
households 
   Nonpoor  Poor  All  Nonpoor Poor All  Nonpoor  Poor  All 
Dependency ratio  2.1  2.9  2.1  1.5  2.0  1.5  1.5  2.0  1.5 
Education                  
Primary and below  3.4  4.8  3.5  17.1  27.6 17.5  20.2  36.4  20.8 
Middle school  26.6  41.9  27.2 48.5  45.1 48.4  53.6  50.0  53.5 
High school  34.6  37.0  34.7 21.6  15.6 21.3  19.3  9.8  19.0 
College and above  35.4  16.2  34.6 12.8  11.7 12.8  6.9  3.7  6.8 
Working status                   
Employed 61.8  21.2  60.1 85.6  36.0 83.6  86.9  37.1  85.2 
Unemployed 4.9  25.7  5.7  1.3  25.4 2.3  1.1  27.3  2.0 
Non-working 33.3  53.1  34.1 13.1  38.6 14.1  12.0  35.6  12.8 
 

















Household head characteristics         
   Male  0.003  0.017  0.008  0.022 
 (2.31)*  (5.85)**  (2.78)**  (4.60)** 
   Age  16-29   -0.005  -0.001  -0.002  0.002 
 (1.68)  (0.23)  (0.85)  (0.54) 
   Age  40-49  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.007 
 (1.99)*  (1.39)  (1.47)  (1.19) 
   Age  50-59   -0.006  0.000  -0.004  0.011 
 (3.71)**  (0.13)  (1.27)  (1.44) 
   Age  60  and  above   -0.012  0.020  0.049  -0.000 
 (7.24)**  (1.80)  (2.40)*  (0.05) 
   Middle  school  -0.000  -0.011  -0.010  0.011 
 (0.12)  (4.57)**  (4.56)**  (1.06) 
   High  school  -0.003  -0.002  -0.008  0.033 
 (1.39)  (0.58)  (2.18)*  (1.85) 
   College  and  above   -0.005  -0.004  -0.004  0.020 
 (1.93)  (0.92)  (0.83)  (1.39) 
   Working   -0.008  -0.032  -0.036  -0.042 
 (3.39)**  (7.20)**  (6.26)**  (2.54)* 
   Nonworking   -0.006  -0.001  -0.019  0.005 
 (2.34)*  (0.19)  (3.20)**  (1.02) 
   Hukou   0.008  -0.009  -0.000  -0.004 
 (0.94)  (3.69)**  (0.01)  (0.70) 
Share of labor with high school 
education or above 
0.000 -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.75)  (2.90)**  (0.98)  (1.94) 
Share of labor employed    -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (9.32)**  (6.96)**  (7.00)**  (4.13)** 
Unemployed labor  0.004  0.026  0.003  0.027 
 (1.67)  (4.17)**  (0.52)  (2.71)** 
Household receives pension  -0.011  -0.011  -0.009  -0.009 
 (4.29)**  (4.14)**  (3.82)**  (2.41)*   4
Household receives 
unemployment insurance 
0.003 -0.010  -0.007  -0.008 
 (1.77)  (2.96)**  (2.01)*  (1.38) 
Household has health insurance  -0.008  0.026  0.112  0.001 
 (3.85)**  (3.34)** (4.67)**  (0.30) 
Household size  -0.001  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003 
 (1.08)  (3.76)**  (3.87)**  (2.15)* 
Wuhan 0.024  0.071  0.034  0.107 
 (5.09)**  (4.70)**  (3.08)**  (2.94)** 
Shenyang 0.028  0.077  0.023  0.265 
 (4.52)**  (3.58)**  (1.72)  (3.55)** 
Fuzhou 0.015  0.055  0.028  0.084 
 (1.91)  (2.63)**  (1.90)  (0.90) 
Xian 0.040  0.019  0.001  0.148 
 (5.76)**  (2.43)*  (0.11)  (3.61)** 
Daqing 0.165  0.146  0.086  0.200 
 (2.88)**  (5.65)**  (4.12)**  (3.45)** 
Wuxi 0.078  0.067  0.038  0.014 
 (2.14)*  (3.93)**  (2.86)**  (0.64) 
Yichan 0.250  0.253  0.156  0.090 
 (3.47)**  (5.78)** (4.42)**  (1.26) 
Benxi 0.051  0.072  0.031  0.039 
 (1.62)  (1.50)  (0.96)  (0.31) 
Zhuhai 0.118  0.071  0.034  0.113 
 (2.47)*  (4.64)**  (2.99)**  (3.05)** 
Baoji 0.140  0.096  0.055   
 (2.58)**  (1.81)  (1.44)   
Shenzhen 0.022  0.032  0.010  0.040 
 (1.14)  (3.31)**  (1.35)  (3.02)** 
Observations 6298  5453  4152  1276 




   5
Table 10   




residents Migrants    Rural  migrants Urban  migrants All 
 Gini  coefficient 
Large  cities  0.388 0.376 0.347 0.439 0.389 
   Shanghai  0.314  0.373  0.351  0.398  0.320 
   Wuhan  0.368  0.351  0.340  0.358  0.368 
   Shenyang  0.364  0.397  0.336  0.453  0.366 
   Fuzhou  0.342  0.319  0.318  0.293  0.344 
   Xian  0.361  0.329  0.302  0.514  0.354 
Small  cities  0.404 0.481 0.403 0.572 0.418 
   Wuxi  0.359  0.541  0.352  0.687  0.387 
   Yichan  0.412  0.497  0.460  0.529  0.417 
   Benxi  0.287  0.392  0.365  0.489  0.289 
   Zhuhai  0.447  0.425  0.412  0.414  0.448 
   Baoji  0.344  0.299  0.294  0.289  0.344 
 Theil  Index 
Large  cities  0.249 0.253 0.204 0.351 0.252 
   Shanghai  0.163  0.246  0.209  0.291  0.169 
   Wuhan  0.233  0.198  0.182  0.219  0.232 
   Shenyang  0.228  0.267  0.202  0.272  0.229 
   Fuzhou  0.193  0.160  0.158  0.156  0.195 
   Xian  0.210  0.201  0.150  0.525  0.208 
Small  cities  0.282 0.596 0.309 0.890 0.337 
   Wuxi  0.233  0.857  0.189  1.153  0.328 
   Yichan  0.271  0.568  0.480  0.624  0.284 
   Benxi  0.149  0.249  0.219  0.362  0.151 
   Zhuhai  0.315  0.374  0.349  0.363  0.348 
   Baoji  0.186  0.150  0.147  0.147  0.187 
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 Table  11 
Comparison of Housing Conditions and Social Insurance Coverage   
of Local Residents and Migrants 
 












Housing conditions (5 large cities)           
    Construction  areas  (square  meters)  18.4  10.7  9.9  15.2 
    Has  drinking  water  (%)  98.8  78.1  75.1  94.1 
    Has  toilet  (%)  88.2  45.5  40.4  73.2 
    Has  heating  (%)  61.7  31.8  27.4  54.8 
Pension  (%)       
    Large  cities  61.0  5.7  2.7  20.9 
    Small  cities  65.5  16.2  10.8  34.7 
Unemployment  insurance  (%)      
    Large  cities  17.6  1.8  1.3  4.1 
    Small  cities  25.0  12.4  8.7  25.3 
Medical  insurance  (%)      
    Large  cities  50.7  3.9  1.8  14.4 




Migrants’ Residential Mobility 
 
 Preferred  future  location 









place Definitely  Possibly 
Definitely 
not 
Large  cities  72.3 19.6  8.1  37.0 46.3 16.8 
Small  cities  77.7 16.8  5.5  29.5 56.3 14.2 
   7
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